The Ezidis – a religious minority or a people?

Scherin is five years old and now goes to kindergarten. She remembers how, when she was registered, the head of the kindergarten asked which language she spoke. Scherin answered: “Ezidi.” The head of the kindergarten seemed confused and asked whether Scherin perhaps meant Kurdish. Scherin answered again: “Ezidi.” Scherin’s father then watched as the head of the kindergarten entered “Kurdish” under ethnic origin. Scherin’s father told her that he is Ezidi. Once again, the head of the kindergarten seemed confused and taken aback.

This example shows the issues that children and young people of Ezidi origin face in Germany. Of course, the head of the kindergarten is not to blame here: her knowledge is largely based on ideologically shaped academic writings (by academics who are not independent and are often financed by the Kurdistan Regional Government), whose thesis is that the Ezidis are a religious minority belonging to the Kurdish people. But what is this myth based on? More on this later…

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the first Ezidis came to Germany, mainly from what is now Turkey, to escape the dire conditions in the Ezidi homeland and to lead a “safer” life in Germany. If you ask the first and second generations living in Germany about their everyday life back then, they almost unanimously say that, unlike today, they had no doubts about their identity in their homeland. In the homeland they continuously represented the Ezidi people (the question of ethnic affiliation will be answered in the course of this article), as the following statements show: “Kurds are Muslims. The Kurmanj were those to whom we were not related, as their culture was very different.” It was not uncommon for the Kurdish people, then called “Kurmanj”, to try to break into certain Ezidi villages of present-day Turkey – such as Khanke and/or Kiwexe – at night and loot them, but in vain, because the Ezidis were prepared for attacks of this kind. You are welcome to ask Ezidis from Kiwexe, Khanke and/or Bacine, who will confirm this. The Ezidis lived in villages. The Ezidi community was found exclusively in its own villages, founded by the Ezidis themselves. They led a “simple” life. At the same time, they lived in constant tension, as they could not foresee when the “Kurmanj” would attack them again. As a result of this experience, the word “Kurmanj” became an insult in the Ezidi community. Both in present-day Turkey and in Ezidi villages in Syria (such as Afkira and Xrbe Xö), the level of education was low because of simple and poor living conditions: working and surviving on the fields was more important than going to school. In their homeland, the Ezidis always identified with the Ezidi people (“mlete ezidi”, which means “the Ezidi people” in Ezidi).

Excursus:

• The Kurmanj were not and are not the Ezidi community. The Kurmanj include former Ezidi citizens who, as a result of wars and forced conversion, adopted a different culture and religion and thus distanced themselves from the Ezidi community.
• In present-day Iran there was a mountain where tribes of Arameans, Jews, Assyrians and Ezidis lived, who were, however, forced to convert to Islam. This forcibly converted group was subsequently called Kurmanj.
• In the Ezidi homeland, “Kurmanj” was, with regard to ethnicity, a synonym for Kurds and, with regard to religion, a synonym for Ezidi-speaking Muslims.

But how is it possible that today – especially in view of the history and experience described above – many Ezidis identify with another people, namely the Kurdish people?

This is not about whether the Ezidis are a people in the legal sense, but about the personal and subjective question of identity.

When reflecting with Ezidis from present-day Turkey, the following is often said:

“The Kurmanj could not assimilate us by force – but they could with an emotionally manipulative policy.”

When the first Ezidis arrived in Germany and the question arose whether they would be granted asylum, they also had to present themselves to the German authorities. Please bear in mind that the Ezidis had only been in Germany for a relatively short time, did not speak the language, felt insecure in their “new” surroundings and depended on the support of others.

At that time, the so-called Kurmanj from the homelands were also in Germany. Many of them have since become intellectuals whose influence on the scholarship about the Ezidi community proved fatal.

Over time, because of a common language and country of origin, a relationship developed between the Kurmanj and the Ezidis.

How did it come about that, over time, Ezidis presented themselves as Kurds when asked about their ethnicity?

You should know that the Ezidis left their homelands reluctantly and with heavy hearts, because a peaceful life had become difficult and over time almost impossible due to assimilation and oppression. In Germany they longed for their homeland for a long time (many of the first generation still do today). Despite having lived in poverty, many Ezidis miss their land, which is expressed to this day in melancholic Ezidi songs.

The Kurds, who were fighting for a state of their own at the same time, promoted the idea in their politics that, with a Kurdish state, the Ezidis would be better off in their homeland and could return, because they would be offered a better life. Ultimately, the Ezidis’ fragile state of mind and their longing were exploited in order to instrumentalise them for the Kurds’ own purposes (a Kurdish state). This process went hand in hand with intensive “raising of hopes”, far removed from actual reality. (Looking back, more and more Ezidis today describe themselves as having been naive and “gullible” back then.)

At the same time, the Kurds created something: a supposedly common enemy (the Turks, or the Turkish state, which stood in the way of the Kurds’ dream of a nation state). Drawing on the Ezidis’ experience of assimilation, oppression and stigmatisation, and exerting psychological influence, the Kurds spoke ever more often to the Ezidis of “a common fate”, a common country and a common language. As a result, people increasingly no longer spoke of “the Ezidis” and “the Kurds”, but only of “the Kurds”.

In the end, everything that could be used for their own purposes was declared Kurdish (it is worth looking at the supposedly authoritative, “Kurdish-dependent” academic literature, in which even the Jewish religious minority is described by Kurds as Kurdish).

But on what ideological basis do the Kurds act in everyday life?

Here it should be very important to look at the politician Abdullah Öcalan and his core idea of democratic confederalism, which is practised in today’s Rojava, or rather northern Syria. Of course, followers of Abdullah Öcalan “fight” for a non-nation state on the basis of democratic confederalism; however, I would like to ask the following question at this point:

To what extent has Kurdish politics, or the ideology of democratic confederalism, helped the Ezidis to realise themselves? What has actually been implemented and achieved for the Ezidi community in the name of the Ezidis (not counting their instrumentalisation for other purposes)?

At this point we would like to draw attention to the inhumane conditions in the Ezidi refugee camps in northern Iraq, which in turn are controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government. At the same time, the political work and ideology of the Kurdistan Regional Government is a major obstacle to the recognition and independence of the Ezidi people, because, historically and to this day, it instrumentalises the Ezidis and at the same time discriminates against them (unequal treatment leading to disadvantage and/or degradation). Furthermore, we would like to draw attention to the religious leader of the Ezidis – Shex Hrto, the Baba Sheikh – who at the beginning of his “term of office” vowed to serve only the Ezidi people, but later publicly represented the Ezidis as Kurds, especially at important events of the Kurdish regional politician Masoud Barzani. This made the “political pressure”, assimilation and oppression – far removed from a democratic life in dignity – visible to the Ezidis. Masoud Barzani’s father, Mustafa Barzani, also resorted to inhuman methods to assimilate the Ezidis. He had dependent radio stations claim continuously that the Ezidis belong to the Kurds, while thousands of Ezidis, above all in the former Soviet Union, held protests against this.

Ultimately, this is not about imposing a particular identity on readers, as everyone should be free to decide what they identify with (a personal question of identity).

However, it should be very important – far from any political influence – to address the question of whether the Ezidis are a religious minority or rather, in the legal sense, a people in their own right. A people in the legal sense exists when a community maintains kinship relations and has its own culture, history and language. On the basis of these characteristics, we will show below that the Ezidi community represents a people.

The Ezidis are related to one another. The clear proof of this lies in taking a closer look at the Ezidi community, which is divided into Sheikhs, Pirs and Murids. A citizen of Kurdish origin will never bear the title of Sheikh, Pir or Murid. (Apart from that, please do not reduce the Sheikh, Pir and Murid question to a religious question, which would not correspond to the actual everyday life of the Ezidis.) Moreover, the Ezidis maintain their own culture, which is not practised in the Kurdish community: Ezidi dishes such as “Külicä” and/or “Schilik” are not found in the Kurdish community. An Ezidi period of mourning after a death usually lasts 3–7 days, while mourning of this kind is not found among the Kurdish people. For traditional reasons, an Ezidi boy has his fringe cut after his first year of life, which in turn is linked to a traditional celebration (in Ezidi: Bisk). This custom is not found in the Kurdish community. After giving birth, an Ezidi woman does not leave her home for 40 days, for cultural reasons. In addition, the Kurdish people speak the Ezidi language and not the other way round, as historically the Ezidi people is thousands of years older than the Kurmanj people.

Critics will certainly present all of the above under the guise of a religious minority. With regard to the question of peoplehood in the legal sense, this does not hold, since by definition a religion is based on a community that lives according to a particular faith laid down in teachings and statutes, and according to its creed.

As far as religion is concerned, the Ezidi people also have a religion, whose knowledge is based on the “Olm” (Ezidi; the Olm is not a religion of the book!).

In other words: an Ezidi should be left the right to decide for themselves whether or not to be religious. To claim that an Ezidi lives their everyday life according to a religion and faith would not reflect reality.

The religion of the Ezidi people is based on the “Olm”. This includes, among other things, the creed and mastery of the “Qewls” (hymns). Now let us go one step further and ask how many Ezidis actually master the Olm and would thus represent a religious minority. You will quickly notice that, in everyday life, the Ezidis do indeed represent a people – and not a religious minority of the Kurdish people.